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. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS , "It is visualized that the role of this type of unit will be to parachute to seize a vitally important area, primarily an airfield, upon which additional troops will later be landed by transport airplane." has also mentioned in a somewhat more vague fashion the idea of "Units of Employment".
These structures would serve as the higher headquarters of the Unit of Action and would
replace what we currently know as division and corps. As the Army presses on with the transformation process and works through the issues associated with rethinking how we are organized and how we will fight at each echelon, now is the time to make individual arguments for force structure.
This paper will address the issue of forcible entry as it pertains to maintaining sufficient capability within the United States Army to execute tasks directed by the Commander in Chief in the execution of our nation's National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. It will address why we need to maintain this capability and by what means we will use to conduct these types of operations. It will address the force structure necessary to conduct forcible entry operations and what these units must do to modernize and keep pace with the rapid process we are making with our Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) and subsequent Objective Force.
It is my belief that the United States Army must retain an airborne division to accomplish the principle task of conducting operational and strategic forcible entry.
At the 2002 Association of the United States Army Convention, TRADOC displayed a computer animation of the fictitious "Battle of Takkbu", set in the year 2016. 3 This simulation is designed to illustrate the concepts, equipment types, and doctrine which have so far been produced through the collective efforts of the US Army. In this fictitious first battle involving the use of the Objective Force, elements of a Unit of Action (roughly a brigade sized force) capture key enemy positions in and around the town of "Takkbu". In the video, the narrator emphasizes the importance of strategic reach and responsiveness. Units are shown arriving into a theater unopposed and moving rapidly into combat. The units arrive in theater using two methods of transportation, shallow draft catamarans and C17 aircraft. In both cases, no enemy force is on hand to deny use of the airfield or to stop the friendly unit as it disembarks from the vessels.
This somewhat optimistic animation glosses over the reality of the more likely scenario, which would be that the enemy commander would attempt to deny access of US forces into the theater. US history is replete with examples of situations where our forces were not granted permissive entry into a theater. Throughout the Twentieth Century, Army and Marine Corps units stormed beaches, dropped out of the sky, and otherwise had to fight their way into the battlefield. When the situation allowed, as in Desert Storm, we were fortunate to have an ally, such as Saudi Arabia, who granted us access to a theater. In these cases, American and coalition forces were able to cross a line of departure and initiate combat operations. As this nation continues to pull forces back to the continental United States and then rely more and more on power projection, it is critical that we maintain a robust capability to conduct forcible entry operations. We should not count on luck or our allies to give us the ability to build up combat power unopposed in a theater.
FORCIBLE ENTRY
Where does the requirement come from to be able to conduct forcible entry operations?
United States Army Field Manual 1 lists "Conduct Forcible Entry Operations" as one of six Army Mission Essential Tasks. 4 As this list is an operational expression of the Army's core competencies, it would appear that the Army's leadership has made some attempt to limit these six tasks to those which lie at the very root of army war-fighting capabilities and requirements.
Interestingly enough, the subsequent METL task on this list is "dominate land operations."
Clearly, it would be difficult to dominate land operations if we lack the capability to force our way into the region.
FM 3.0 is also very specific about the forcible entry requirement. "Army forces make it possible for JFCs to seize areas previously denied by the enemy force. Army forces can strike contested areas from the air, land, and sea. They can establish and secure lodgments for projecting follow-on forces and sustaining the joint force. The airborne and air assault capabilities of Army forces allow JFCs to seize airfields or other important facilities." 5 This more recent publication makes the case for retaining a great deal of flexibility; referencing forcible entry operations from the air, land, and sea.
Since neither FM 1 nor FM 3.0 have been rewritten since General Shinseki's efforts to transform our Army, perhaps we should look elsewhere to see if we will still need to be able to force our way into a theater. In the US Army White Paper -"Concepts for the Objective Force", is very specific about retaining the capability. "In the face of enemy anti-access measures, the Objective Force will retain the ability to conduct forcible entry operations. Forcible entry will occur from both strategic and operational distances. The reference in the White Paper to operational and strategic distances is key.
Traditionally, forcible entry has been conducted through one of three methodologies:
amphibious, helicopter-borne air assault, or airborne. Largely speaking, the United States
Army has not conducted a stand alone amphibious operation since the Second World War. The
United States Marine Corps is the only service that has retained the equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures to conduct an amphibious assault into an opposed shore, port, or beachhead. This type of assault, given the present type of shipping, may be executed from a tactical, operational, or strategic distance. This is not to say that the United States Army could not execute one; it merely concedes that the Marine Corps will more than likely retain amphibious assault as a unique capability into the foreseeable future. This leaves air assault and airborne forcible entry options to the US Army.
The biggest limiting factor in conducting air assaults is the operating range of our current inventory of helicopters. This range may extend up to 150 kilometers without refueling
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Ranges of this nature generally fit into the tactical arena, although terms such as tactical are more a matter of scope, not distance. Some may argue that an air assault such as conducted by the 101 st Airborne Division during Desert Storm was operational in terms of its impact on the overall operation. Regardless, it would be a real stretch to claim that an air assault force could conduct an operation of strategic reach. This generally implies that the distances are from outside of a theater into a given theater. This is not to imply that air assault forces will have no place in the Objective Force
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. Air assault forces will more than likely remain in the force structure to give the JFC added flexibility.
Having generally narrowed the forcible entry options from the many (amphibious, air assault, and airborne) down to just airborne, it is important to spell out exactly what is meant by the term airborne operation and to discuss why this twentieth century medium has applicability in the Interim and Objective Force.
WHY AIRBORNE?
HISTORICAL Losses were exceptionally high, with 5140 out of 13,000 paratroopers either killed or wounded in action.
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Additionally, and of significant impact on the impending Operation Barbarossa, was the loss of over 350 German aircraft in the victory over British forces on Crete. Hitler was distressed over these high losses and declared that the days of large-scale airborne operations had passed. The allies drew the opposite conclusion: "the outside world, not privy to Germany's appalling losses on Crete, was stunned by this lightening-like airborne victory". 13 In the U.S. Army eyes, Crete, more than any other single factor,"proved" that airborne forces were here to stay" and "led Marshall to initiate plans to field a substantial number of American airborne forces." on the size of the objective required to be cleared. In many situations, such as in the complex urban terrain surrounding a major international airfield, the number of assault battalions increases due to the number of buildings, hangers, and other structures which must be cleared.
Additional forces must be allocated to isolate routes into the airhead line, to provide for a reserve, and to assault any other specific targets identified by the airborne commander. In addition to infantry forces, organic airborne artillery, air defense, military police, medical service corps, signal, and other forces are given specific tasks to support the establishment of a lodgment. Due to the importance of opening the airfield's runways for use by fixed wing aircraft, the engineer element deserves special mention. Airborne engineers are organized and equipped with a Light Airfield Repair Platoon (LARP) that has the capability to conduct hasty repairs on damaged runways. All of these forces are specifically equipped, organized, and trained to conduct these specific types of operations. In fact, the airfield seizure mission is the 82 nd Airborne Division's number one mission focus. 17 As stated previously, in this type of operation, the stated purpose of the operation is to conduct a parachute assault to seize an airfield facility, eliminate all local enemy resistance, repair or otherwise open up the runway to receive arriving aircraft, and then receive follow-on forces.
18 These follow-on forces may be additional airborne forces under the command of the initial airborne commander or they may be non-airborne forces, arriving with whatever mix of forces is necessary for follow-on missions.
The flow of forces into the theater by the Combatant or JTF Commander allows for great flexibility once the initial airhead becomes a lodgment (the airhead becomes a lodgment upon receipt of the first air-landed aircraft).
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE '02
The This highly publicized operation showcased the interoperability requirements associated with conducting a forcible entry operation. In order to successfully execute follow-on missions on the ground, the arriving SBCT elements required access to critical information from the airborne unit, particularly information on enemy and friendly disposition. This information must be relayed through the JTF headquarters and to the unit either prior to its departure from its forward operating base or enroute to the objective area. Interoperability considerations will be addressed later in this paper.
WHY AN AIRBORNE DIVISION?
As The drawback to the idea of distributing airborne forces across each of the Units of Action or Units of Employment is that the airfield seizure mission is a highly specialized task that requires unique outload deployment facilities, a close lash up to the United States Air Force, and experienced and well resourced command and control. Each of these three areas will be addressed in detail in later paragraphs. In addition to the three areas just mentioned, the unique individual and collective training requirements for an airborne task force would be particularly difficult to address in a decentralized fashion.
Unique facilities
The 82 
Experienced C2
The requirement to conduct a forcible entry airborne operation into contested enemy airspace requires an exceptionally experienced and well-trained organization. Although the commander of the ground force, normally referred to as the airborne commander, is normally the battalion or brigade commander, depending on the size of the force deploying, it requires additional command and control to execute the operation. In the 82 nd Airborne Division, the division staff is extremely involved in the planning and execution of each airfield seizure operation. The short fused nature of these operations normally requires an extremely close working relationship between the various headquarters, with parallel planning occurring from corps/division down to company level. Division and brigade staffs frequently execute the airfield seizure mission, usually at least once every four to six weeks. As a result, the experience base of the collective staffs, the standardization which is possible with nine similar battalions under one division headquarters, and the close working relationship with the USAF are maintained at an exceptionally high level. With this level of training, it is possible to execute the entire planning process from alert to wheels up of the first battalion task force in eighteen hours. Functions of the JACC/CP may include pre-assault fires, collection and dissemination of joint intelligence products to the airborne commander, and the final "Go/NoGo" brief that occurs twenty minutes prior to the execution of the parachute assault. As with the previous examples, this is a highly trained and experienced staff that executes this function literally dozens of times each year. Given the complexity and specialized nature of this mission, it would be very unlikely that a similar level of proficiency could be expected if each of the Units of Employment would be required to conduct the command and control functions of a forcible entry parachute assault with organic airborne forces.
Individual Training
The individual training requirements of the paratroopers and jumpmasters are much more efficient to achieve and sustain in an airborne division. Traditionally, the Non Commission
Officers of the division serve multiple assignments in the division and ensure standards are Were the Army to distribute airborne forces across the force, individual training concerns could be addressed without too much difficulty, but certainly lend themselves to a consolidation of airborne units at a single location.
Collective Training
Maintaining collective skills at the battalion and brigade level is a cumbersome task for the United States Air Force to support. Limited airframes and increasing OPTEMPO on strategic airlift assets requires the efficient employment of these assets in the training environment.
Since all nine of the 82 nd Airborne Division's infantry battalions are co-located at Fort Bragg, the USAF is able to support the division in an extraordinarily efficient manner. Once a month, a "large package" of airframes ( extremely experienced airborne leader would be nearly impossible to replicate were the airborne force to be distributed.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AIRBORNE FORCE
The airborne brigade and battalions must be modernized and equipped as closely as possible to the Objective Force Unit of Action in order to fight alongside them on the battlefield.
These airborne forces must have the same degree of situational awareness, ability to achieve effects, and command and control as the Objective Force. Units must be able to adjust their plans enroute to the drop zone, achieve decisive results immediately upon hitting the drop zone, and then be able to coordinate their efforts with the arriving unit of action in order to conduct passage on lines and possibly fight by their side. Although, the US Army has no intention of heavy dropping the Stryker Combat Vehicle or the Future Combat System, the airborne task force commander must make do with lighter and fully modernized systems.
28

Command and Control
During the preparation phase of Millennium Challenge '02, the 2 nd Brigade, 82 nd Airborne
Division was issued and trained on the command and control systems currently being validated by the Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis. This suite of systems was inserted into the National Training Center "battlefield" with the airborne brigade task force and ensured that the initial entry force was able to maintain close contact with the Joint Task Force Commander and the follow-on air land SBCT force during the critical entry phase of the battle. 29 As these systems continue through the acquisition process and are fielded to the Interim Force, similar systems must be fielded to the airborne forces that will precede them onto the battlefield. Since the C2 version of the Stryker Combat Vehicle will not be issued to the airborne force, the system must be installed on HMMWVs and hardened to survive the parachute insertion onto the battlefield.
Another essential system that has demonstrated its utility during MC02 was the Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System (EMPRS). The Army Chief of Staff stated that the Objective Force must be capable of en route mission planning and rehearsal. 30 EMPRS, proven by the airborne during previous Advanced Warfighting Experiments, is just the tool to assist with command and control throughout the deployment process. 31 Using this system, commanders may fine tune, rehearse, and communicate the plan while the airborne task force is in the air en route to the objective. Given the fact that the task force may be in the air for as long as twenty hours, commanders must have a flexible tool which allows for adjustments to the plan based upon the receipt of additional intelligence or other key factors.
32
Land Warrior
The US Army Land Warrior System has provided light, ranger, and airborne forces unique capabilities that will enable them to achieve a much higher level of efficiency and effectiveness on future battlefields. This system allows the dismounted force to achieve a level of situational awareness and interoperability that has been impossible to achieve with traditional equipment.
The heart of the system is the man-portable computer and the integrated helmet mounted communications system. Each operator has a heads-up display which shows friendly and enemy dispositions, and to view data from the computer. The integrated GPS and communications system allows leaders to track every man on the battlefield. Pull down menus on the computer screen allow leaders to digitally call for fire, send reports, and transmit digital images from the optics and thermal site on the M4 modular weapons system. 
LOSAT
As mentioned previously, restrictions on size and weight of the Stryker Combat Vehicle and the Future Combat System will prohibit the fielding of these systems to the airborne force.
To make up for the lack of firepower during the crucial moments immediately following the airfield seizure, the Army will have to aggressively pursue the fielding of lightweight and lethal systems such as the Line-of-Site Anti-Tank (LOSAT). This HMMWV mounted system has the capability of defeating any armor system in the world through the use of kinetic energy missiles.
This system, which is being fielded to the 82 nd Airborne Division this year, is exactly the sort of transitional system that pushes the paratrooper's capability forward into the new century.
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Other lightweight and extremely lethal system, such as the Javelin Anti-tank system (which replaced its antiquated cousin the M47 Dragon in the late nineties) will continue to provide the light fighter with devastating firepower in a small enough package to be dropped onto the battlefield via parachute. Modernization of the airborne force will be essential to keeping up with the Objective Force units.
RECOMMENDATION
The United States Army has brilliantly grabbed the bull by the horns and is tackling the issues associated with transformation. Creating lighter, more lethal, and more deployable
forces is exactly what this nation needs to do in order to rapidly and decisively defeat adversaries anywhere on the globe. It is extremely important as we flesh out the details of this Interim Force and develop the concepts for the Objective Force that we don't forget the lessons of history. We must retain a robust capability to conduct forcible entry operations from operational and strategic distances. For the foreseeable future, airborne forces and their associated air-droppable equipment are the best solution to the problem. Because of the exhaustive nature of equipping, manning, training, deploying, and employing these airborne forces, the best course of action to retain our strategic forcible entry capability is through the use of an airborne division. This airborne division must be fully modernized and made to be completely interoperable with our Interim Forces. Advances in lethality, C4ISR, firepower, and every other operating system must be made available to this airborne force. Systems such as Land Warrior and the Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System are perfect examples of cutting edge technology that enable the airborne commander to be interoperable with Interim Force commanders. Even though equipping airborne forces with the Stryker Combat Vehicle may not be efficient in terms of airdropability, the Army is fielding systems such as the LOSAT to give the airborne commander the firepower he needs to accomplish his mission on the ground. Once on the ground, the airborne force is a key force multiplier for the Interim Force
Commander. Light and fully modernized airborne forces can fight alongside the Interim Force and be his principle tool for eliminating enemy forces in urban, jungle, mountainous, or other complex terrain. Although it may be tempting to distribute these wonderfully talented and capable troopers to each of the Units of Employment in the Objective Force, the complexity of their forced entry mission, the necessary experience of each staff from battalion through division, and the efficiencies gained from centrally locating all of our airborne forces requires that the United States Army retain an airborne division in the force structure. There will always be a place on the battlefield for a well-trained paratrooper.
ENDNOTES
